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Abstract
This paper decomposes wage bill changes at the firm level into components due to wage changes,
and components due to net flows of employment. The analysis relies on an administrative
employer-employee dataset of individual annual earnings matched with firms' annual accounts for
Belgium over the period 1997-2001. Results point to asymmetric behaviour depending on
economic conditions. On average, wage bill contractions result essentially from employment cuts
in spite of wage increases. Wage growth of job stayers is moderated but still positive; and wages of
entrants compared with those of incumbents are no lower. The labour force cuts are achieved
through both reduced entries and increased exits. Higher exits may be due to more layoffs,
especially in smaller firms, and wider use of early retirement, especially in manufacturing. In
addition, the paper points up the role of overtime hours, temporary unemployment and interim
workers in adapting to short-run fluctuations.
Keywords: wages, employment flows, matched employer-employee data
JEL: J30, J605
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Non-technical summary
This paper analyses simultaneously wage and employment variations, and their relative
contribution to wage bill adjustment. Recent studies point to a high degree of wage rigidity, and
particularly so in Belgium. In a situation of wage rigidity, employment is expected to drive most of
wage bill variations. However, another strand of the literature on this subject points to non-
negligible adjustment costs, such as the cost of hiring and firing, that restrict employment
adjustment. In such cases, variations in the number of employees may be limited. Changes in hours
worked may then be achieved mainly through variations in the number of hours worked per
employee, as well as by interim workers hired from temporary employment agencies. This may
provide a flexible adjustment tool in response to short-run variations in production.
  This paper investigates the main driving variables of wage bill fluctuations. More precisely, it
decomposes variations of the wage bill at the firm level into four components: (1) one associated
with changes in the wages of job stayers (employees that work for the firm in year t-1 and in year
t), (2) another due to the differences between the wage of entrants (employees that work in the firm
in year t but not in t-1) and wages of exiters (employees that work in the firm in year t-1 but not in
t), (3) one related to intra-year net flows of employment, (4) and the last due to between-year net
flows of employment.
  The decomposition is performed separately for periods of wage bill growth and periods of
wage bill contraction. It is backed up by information on wages per type of worker (by occupation,
age and whether they are job stayers or newly-hired workers), and on entries and exits. Finally, it
also considers the evolution of hours worked per employee and hours worked by interim workers.
   The analysis relies on an administrative dataset of around one-third of individual annual
earnings of the private sector merged with firms' annual accounts and social balance sheets for
Belgium, over the period 1997-2001, for the manufacturing, construction and commercial services
sectors.
  The results show that, on average, wage changes and net employment flows contribute to wage
bill fluctuations in the same proportion. However, comparing favourable and adverse economic
situations highlights a strongly asymmetric pattern. If wage bills contract, wage growth remains
positive on average, so that job cuts make up the bulk of the reduction in the wage bill.
  The analysis is performed for firms of different size classes and sectors, as well as for cases of
falling sales. The results indicate that smaller firms and the construction and services sectors
experience larger fluctuations in wage bill growth and employment than do larger firms and the
manufacturing sector. The drop in wage bill growth is larger in cases of wage bill contraction than
in cases of falling sales.
  In cases of wage bill contraction, wage growth of job stayers is moderated but remains positive.
In order words, there is, on average, no cut in the wages of job stayers. This is consistent with
previous empirical evidence of high downward wage rigidity for Belgium, and with the
institutional features of the Belgian labour market, such as full automatic indexation of basic
wages. Furthermore, there is no evidence that firms reduce the pay rate of entrants relative to6
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incumbents in adverse times. This may result from fairness, efficiency wage considerations, as well
as the fact that pay scales are determined at a highly disaggregated level by collective bargaining
agreement. Consequently, the average wage level in the firm does not diminish.
  Therefore, employment contractions are the main source of wage bill reductions. Because
layoffs may be a more costly way of reducing employment levels, I consider alternative ways of
reducing the labour force. Firstly, the number of employees may diminish by reducing new hires.
As part of the workforce leaves the firm every year on a voluntary basis or due to retirement,
reducing entries may lead to employment contraction. Accordingly, not renewing fixed-term
workers’ contracts has the same effect. The second alternative to costly layoffs may be early
retirement. In Belgium, this may apply to distressed firms under specific conditions for workers
aged 50 and over. The results show that reductions in the labour force are achieved both through
reduced entries and, to a slightly lesser extent, through increased exits. There is evidence that early
retirement is more common in unfavourable economic circumstances, possibly thanks to special
rules applying to firms in difficulty. This is especially the case in the manufacturing sector. Results
also point to a slight fall in fixed-term contract hires, particularly in large firms and in the
manufacturing industry.
  Lastly, in addition to a reduction in the number of employees, the number of hours worked may
diminish, through a lowering of overtime hours, the use of temporary unemployment, as well as
interim workers hired from temporary employment agencies. These may prove particularly suitable
to adjust to short-term fluctuations in production. These mechanisms also find support in the paper.
It reports evidence of a reduction in hours worked and number of days worked (possibly due to
temporary unemployment), as well as a cut in hours worked by interim workers, particularly more
so in cases of sales contraction.
  All together, the paper pleads for a broad view of the wage bill adjustment margins under
changing economic conditions.7
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1. Introduction
Wage rigidity and employment adjustment have received a lot of attention, but they have generally
been investigated separately. On the one hand, wage rigidity has been shown to have strong
implications for unemployment as well as inflation and monetary policy (see, for example,
Blanchard and Gali, 2006). Recent microeconomic evidence points to substantial resistance to cut
wages (see Dickens et al., 2006, 2007), or sluggish reaction to transitory shocks (Guiso et al., 2005)
or to adverse shocks (Biscourp et al., 2005). On the other hand, a large literature on employment
adjustment points to strong non-linear adjustment costs (see, for instance, Cooper et al., 2004) and
lumpy employment changes (see, among others, Caballero et al., 1997). The present study
considers jointly the relative importance of wage and employment variations in the event of
changes in total labour costs.
  More precisely, this paper assesses the variables that account for most of the wage bill
fluctuations, and whether the pattern is asymmetric under favourable or adverse economic
conditions. It builds on Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) who apply Davis and Haltiwanger’s (1992)
decomposition to the wage bill. I decompose changes in the wage bill at the firm level1 into four
main components: (1) one due to changes in the wages of job stayers (employees that work for the
firm in year t-1 and in year t), (2) another due to the differences between the wage of entrants
(employees that work in the firm in year t but not in t-1) and wages of exiters (employees that work
in the firm in year t-1 but not in t), (3) one due to intra-year net flows of employment, (4) and the
last due to net flows of employment between years.
  Whether labour market rigidities generate more wage rigidity or restricted employment flows is
not a priori clear and has to be determined on empirical grounds. If wages are rigid, employment
may account for most of the wage bill fluctuations. In the presence of downward wage rigidity in
particular, employment cuts may explain most of the wage bill contraction. However, other market
features may limit the scope for adjusting employment. For example, firing costs may restrict job
cuts. Other adjustment margins, such as hours worked (and overtime hours) may then substitute for
changes in the number of employees, in the same way as hours hired from temporary employment
agencies.
  The above discussion needs a few clarifications. First, downward wage rigidity has been
provided for full-time job stayers (individuals that stay within the same firm for at least two
consecutive years)2. Institutional features of the Belgian labour market, such as full automatic
indexation, prevent real wage decreases, and henceforth nominal wage cuts. This explains the high
degree of downward real wage rigidity found among full-time permanent job stayers in Belgium
(see Du Caju et al., 2007, or Knoppik and Beissinger, 2005). However, firms might cut their
average wage bill by reducing the wages of entrants relative to those of stayers. Support for this
option can be found in Fehr and Goette (2005) for Switzerland. They find significantly stronger
1   In contrast, Kramarz and Duhautois (2006) perform their decomposition on a aggregate basis.
2   This is the case, for instance, of Altonji and Devereux (1999), Biscourp et al. (2005), Dickens et al. (2006, 2007), Du
Caju et al. (2007), Guiso et al. (2005), Kahn (1997), Knoppik and Beissinger (2005), Nickell and Quintini (2003).8
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wage rigidity for job stayers than for movers. It should be noted that, in Belgium, pay scales,
defined by sector, profession and age through collective agreements by social partners, provide a
lower wage bound by sector, profession and age. This partly prevents discrimination between
entrants and incumbents. In addition, considerations such as fairness, efficiency wage or others,
may prevent firms from discriminatory practices. Additionally, changes in the firm's average wage
bill may also result from changes in the composition of the labour force. For example, younger
workers typically earn less than older workers; blue-collar workers have lower wages than white-
collar workers.
  Next, exits may take the form of voluntary quits, retirement, early retirement or redundancy.
Retirement is related to age and voluntary quits depend, in principle, on workers only. Therefore,
one typically expects that layoffs provide the main adjustment tool in adverse times. In this respect,
employment flows may differ across worker types. First, there are no firing costs for fixed-length
contracts or for interim workers (who are hired from temporary employment agencies). Therefore,
one may expect to find that employment reductions concentrate on these workers. Second, firing
older workers may be more costly than dismissing younger employees. The reason is twofold.
Firm-specific human capital is higher for higher-tenured workers. And firing costs also increase
with tenure. Note that in Belgium, early retirement is allowed for older workers (from the age of
50) in cases of deep restructuring, so that a large fraction of exits may concentrate on older
workers. Finally, labour may be adjusted through changes in hours worked. This may be achieved
through increases in overtime hours in the event of labour shortages or through temporary
unemployment in cases of excess labour. Furthermore, interim workers hired from temporary
employment agencies provide an additional flexible tool to adjust hours.
  The primary goal of the paper is to assess the relative contribution of wage fluctuations and
employment changes to wage bill variations under favourable or adverse economic conditions.
Complementary information on job flows and wages is used to provide a deeper understanding of
the adjustment margins. First of all, I investigate whether wage changes are due to variations in
wages of job stayers, or to differentiated compensation of entrants relative to incumbents. Further, I
consider wage changes of blue-collar and white-collar workers, as well as the average age of the
firm's labour force. Next, the nature of employment adjustment is considered along three lines.
First, employment reductions may be due to increased exits or reduced entries. Firing restrictions
may limit the use of layoffs so that the net reduction in employment may be achieved primarily
through reducing the number of entrants. Second, firing costs may also lead to lower redundancies
among workers with open-ended contracts, and bigger cuts in the number of workers with fixed-
term contracts, as there are no firing costs to pay at the end of the contract. I also examine the use
of early retirement as a way of adjusting workforce size. Third and finally, I consider alternative
adjustment margins. In cases where there are high labour adjustment costs such as hiring costs due
to advertising, matching and training costs, as well as firing costs, hours worked and manpower
workers may be a useful buffer to changing economic conditions, such as a sudden and unforeseen
change in demand, at least in the short run.9
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  The analysis relies on an administrative dataset of individual annual earnings in the private
sector held by the social security administration merged with firms' annual accounts and social
balance sheets for Belgium over the period 1997-2001. The dataset on individual annual earnings is
a random sample which includes one-third of the exhaustive administrative dataset. It is used to
compute the average wage of stayers, entrants and exiters by firm. Social balance sheets provide
the number of entrants, stayers and exiters for each firm, as well as additional information. The
public sector as well as small firms are excluded from the analysis. I restrict the dataset to the
manufacturing, construction and commercial services sectors.
  Broadly, the results indicate that although one-half of the wage bill growth is attributable to
wage increases and the other half to employment growth, wage bill contractions are primarily
attributable to employment cuts. On average, there is no evidence of wage reductions during
adverse economic conditions. At most, wage growth simply slows down. Further, there is no
evidence that wages of entrants relative to that of incumbents are any lower in bad times. However,
firms may in some cases save on their average wage bill by concentrating exits among older and
higher-wage workers. Owing to resistance to wage cuts, wage bill contractions are achieved
primarily through employment cuts. Under unfavourable circumstances, the labour force is brought
down through several margins. First, employment is lowered through less hiring. Second, there is
also an increase in the number of exits. This is achieved not only through retirement, early
retirement, and no renewal of temporary contracts, but also through wider layoffs, which are
generally speaking more costly. Third, the number of hours and days worked is reduced compared
to favourable economic conditions. This suggests that firm reduce overtime hours and make use of
temporary unemployment in adverse times. Fourth, the use of manpower workers, which do not
formally belong to the firms' workforce but are hired from temporary employment agencies, is also
limited in times of contraction.
  Against this general view, the results point to differences according to firms’ characteristics
and sectors. Stronger variations in wage bill growth and employment are seen in smaller firms and
in the construction and services sectors than in larger firms and the manufacturing sector. Further,
sales declines lead to a bigger reduction in hours, days worked and manpower workers than wage
bill contractions.
  The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the wage bill decomposition. Section 3
describes the data and relevant institutional features of the Belgian labour market. Section 4
presents the results of the wage bill decomposition together with additional descriptive statistics.
First, wage bill adjustment in cases of wage bill expansion is compared with that related to wage
bill contraction. Then the analysis is repeated for firms from different size classes, as well as for
different sectors of economic activity. Finally, I repeat the exercise defining adverse conditions
with respect to sales. Note that adverse times are defined at the firm level. They may capture
aggregate business cycle fluctuations, sector-specific as well as firm-specific variations.
Robustness to alternative cleaning of the dataset and various definitions of the sample splits are
also reported in Appendix. Section 5 concludes.10
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2. Decomposing wage bill changes
The following wage bill decomposition builds on Duhautois and Kramarz (2006). Consider the
wage bill of firm i at time t, WBit, that employs Jit workers (indexed by j), with annual earnings wjit,
and define the wage bill growth as follows:
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  At time t, firm i employs Jit employees, from which there are Sit stayers (workers that are
employed in the firm in t-1 and in t), Nit entrants (workers that are employed in the firm in t but not
in t-1). Compared to the previous period, Eit-1 exiters (workers that are employed in the firm in t-1
but not in t) left the firm. Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) break wage bill growth down into one
component due to changes in the wage bill of stayers and one component due to the wage bill
associated with entrants, and one related to exiters:
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 In  the  above  formula,  wjit refers to annual earnings. In this paper, I rewrite the expression in
terms of daily earnings multiplied by the number of days worked:
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  As will be explained in the next section, the dataset used in this paper is not exhaustive. For
each firm, data is available for around one-third of the employees, rather than all employees as in
Duhautois and Kramarz (2006). Therefore, one cannot compute the sum over individual earnings.
To get round this, I consider the average wage and number of work days per stayers, entrants and
exiters. The equations denote by it
dS w  the average daily wage of job stayers in firm i in year t,
it
dN w  the average daily wage of entrants in firm i in year t, and 1  it
dE w  the average daily wage of
exiters in firm i in year t-1. Accordingly, it
S D  is the average number of work days by job stayers in
firm i in year t, 1 it
S D   is the average number of work days by job stayers in firm i in year t-1, it
N D
is the average number of work days by entrants in firm i in year t, and 1 it
E D   is the average
number of work days by exiters in firm i in year t-1. Finally, the denominator ¦ it
jit
J w , gives the
firm 's total wage bill. The wage bill growth decomposition becomes:11
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This allows to decompose each term further, distinguishing between variations in the wage bill that
are due to changes in job stayers’ wages, changes in the number of days worked by job stayers,
differences between entrants’ and exiters’ wages, and differences between the total number of days
worked by entrants and the total number of days worked by exiters:
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  The last two terms may be interpreted in terms of net flows of workers. One advantage of
measuring the labour force through both the number of employees and the number of days worked
is that it measures not only net flows between year t and t-1 (the last term) but also takes into
account exits within the year (the third term). In Duhautois and Kramarz (2006), the third term is
not separated from the first one. They measure changes in the wage bill due to stayers but do not
distinguish between changes due to wage variation and those due to changes in the number of days
worked. On the contrary, the above decomposition separates the two effects. This may be relevant
in case of intra-year job flows. Indeed, job stayers are defined as workers that are present in the
firm in year t-1 and in year t, and are included in the wage bill of year t and t-1. Of course, some of
these people may have started working in March t-1, for instance, or leave the firm in July of year t.
Therefore, although job stayers are the same in year t and year t-1, the number of days worked by
job stayers does not necessarily have to be identical in year t and year t-1. Therefore, if the third
term is negative, there is a decrease in the total number of days worked by stayers, which I interpret
as an intra-year negative net flow of workers.
  The primary objective of this decomposition is to assess the variables that explain most of the
wage bill fluctuations at the firm level. Due to labour market rigidities, it may be much easier to
adjust the wage bill upwards than downwards. Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) results show that the
adjustment mechanisms are different in cases of wage bill creation and wage bill destruction.
Biscourp et al. (2005) provide evidence of an asymmetric response of wage changes to a firm's
productivity shocks. Therefore, the analysis of each component of the wage bill is performed12
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separately for "good times" and "bad times" defined according to wage bill growth. In a later stage,
I also use a definition based on sales growth. As these criteria may be endogenous3, robustness
analyses with alternative sample splits (including lagged values of the sample split criteria) are also
carried out. However, most of the analysis is undertaken for the year in which the adverse situation
is observed. Also, I consider separately medium-sized firms and large firms, and differences across
sectors are investigated.
  In each of these cases, the wage bill decomposition is supplemented by descriptive statistics on
variables taken from firms' social balance sheets. The wage and age of entrants (exiters) relative to
stayers gives information about differentiated pay policy for entrants versus incumbents and
possible composition effects, as do changes in the wage of blue-collar and white-collar workers.
Detailed information about job flows is also provided, such as the percentage of entrants and
exiters, the percentage of exiters by motive of exits, the percentage of entrants and exiters by
contract duration (open-ended vs fixed-term). Finally, information on other adjustment margins is
also reported. Increases in hours worked per employee may reveal wider use of overtime hours.
Reductions in the number of days worked may be an indication of temporary unemployment.
Lastly, the percentage and evolution of interim workers hired from temporary employment
agencies is also given.
3. Data description and institutional features of the Belgian labour market
3.1 Data description
The analysis rests on an administrative matched employer-employee dataset on individual annual
earnings of workers in the private sector merged with firms' annual account information. The
dataset includes all people born between the 5th and the 15th of each month. It covers the period
1990-2002 and the entire private sector. If the sample of individual wages per firm was exhaustive,
the exact wage bill decomposition in equation (3) could be computed. Because the dataset only
includes about one-third of the employees, this paper relies on an alternative approximate
decomposition, given by equation (7), where average daily wages and work days are computed as
firm averages from the individual earnings dataset; and the total wage bill (in the denominator),
number of stayers, entrants and exiters are taken from firms' annual accounts.
  Data on individual earnings are held by the social security administration and used to compute
retirement benefits. This includes gross annual earnings, so it covers bonuses, premia, overtime
hours, social security contributions paid by employees, but not employers' social security
contributions, retirement provisions, private insurance paid by employers, and so on. The figures
also include the number of work days, and some individual characteristics such as age, gender and
occupation.
3   For example, a drop in demand, and therefore in sales, may lead to a drop in production and therefore employment
cuts.13
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  People below 18 years or above the legal retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men) are
excluded from this dataset. Annual earnings that are below the legal minimum age4 or above the
(yearly defined) 99th percentile are excluded5. Further, people with more than one occupation
within the same firm are excluded6. Finally, the analysis focuses on full-year jobs. These are
defined as workers with a minimum of 10 months within the same firm (possibly over two
consecutive years)7. In order to ensure that entrants in 2001 are full-year workers, the period
covered only goes up to 20018.
  This administrative data on individual earnings is merged with information from firms’ annual
accounts. In Belgium, (almost) all firms have to file their annual accounts. The dataset includes all
sectors of economic activity excluding credit institutions. Annual accounts consist of balance sheet
data and, since 1996, a so-called social balance sheet. The latter reports information on the number,
costs, flows, and composition of the workforce. Among other things, it reports information on the
number of workers, entrants, and exiters. It also provides a firm's total labour costs as well as the
costs and hours worked by interim workers hired from temporary employment agencies. A
distinction is made according to whether jobs are full-time or part-time. The workforce is given in
terms of the number of people employed as well as in full-time equivalents. Finally, entries and
exits are given by contract type (open-ended, fixed-term, replacement job, or for a specialised task).
And exits are given separately according to retirement, early retirement, layoffs or other reasons.
  Because medium-sized and large firms report more detailed information9, and in order to
ensure representativeness of the firm’s average daily earnings computed from the individual
earnings dataset, I focus on medium-sized and large firms. Additional data trimming concerns the
legal situation of the firm and exclusion of outliers from the variables of interest. Foreign and
public companies and non-profit associations are excluded from the sample. Also, only annual
accounts covering the period from January to December are considered in order to ensure
consistency between firms, and between annual accounts and individual earnings data10.
In addition to the above-mentioned selection criteria, the following consistency checks are
performed. The number of employees at the end of the year, and the average number of employees
over the year, as reported in the notes to the annual accounts must be the same as the figures
4   The legal minimum wage applies to workers over 21.5 years old and with a tenure of at least six months. Therefore,
younger or low-tenure workers may have below minimum wage earnings.
5   This trimming is motivated by the fact that the wage bill decomposition relies on the average wages per firm.
6   It is impossible to compute the wage change in this case.
7   The threshold is set at 10 months in order to allow for sick leave. Sick leave is limited to two months so that there is
no overlap with temporary jobs. Results presented below are robust to a trimming that would allow for one to four
months’ sick leave.
8   In order to verify that a worker entering a firm in 2001 works in that firm for at least 10 months, we need
information for the year 2002. For example, a worker who enters a firm in July 2001 has worked 6 months in that
firm in 2001. It is considered in the sample if he works at least 4 months in the same firm in 2002, and excluded
otherwise. This criterion cannot be used for entrants in 2002 because no data is available for 2003.
9   According to Belgian accounting legislation, a company falls within this category, in 2007, either when the yearly
  average of its workforce is at least 100 or when at least two of the following thresholds are exceeded: (1) yearly
average of workforce is 50, (2) turnover (excluding VAT) amounts to at least EUR 7,300,000, (3) total assets exceed
EUR 3,650,000. In general, the latter two thresholds are altered every four years in order to take account of inflation.
10   In some cases, annual accounts refer to only part of the year. In other cases, the period covered spans several years.
For instance, in 1997, a firm reports for the period August 1996 to July 1997. If, in future, it wants to report for the
period from January to December, then in 1998 it will report from August 1997 to December 1998.14
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reported in the social balance sheet. Also I keep only those firms for which net job flows reported
in the social balance sheet, defined as the difference between entries and exits, do not deviate from
five in absolute value from the changes in net employment given in the annual accounts over two
consecutive years. Further, the number of entries over the year cannot exceed the number of
employees at the end of the year11.
  Contrary to typical job creation-job destruction analysis, I also trim the data for outliers. This
contrasts with, for instance, Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) or Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), who
examine job creation and destruction from an aggregate perspective. Analysing all firms in the
economy is especially useful to derive macroeconomic information on job creation and destruction.
This type of analysis captures extreme events such as wage bill destruction due to massive
downsizing of a large firm. Therefore, trimming for outliers is ruled out. On the contrary, this paper
attempts to understand how individual firms adjust their labour costs and employment. This is a
preliminary step to understanding firms' reaction to microeconomic events. Because the present
analysis is based on averages across firms and years, removing extreme observations is essential.
The concern is more on wage bill management under normal business conditions rather than under
exceptional circumstances, i.e. extreme observations are excluded.
  Outliers are removed by excluding observations below the 1st percentile or above the 99th
percentile (defined year by year) of the following variables: wage bill growth, employment growth
(defined with respect to the number of employees and full-time equivalents), sales growth (in
nominal and real terms), growth in value added (in nominal and real terms), profits-assets ratio,
profitability over assets (net and gross), productivity growth (defined with respect to the number of
employees and FTEs). As explained in the robustness analysis in Appendix 4, alternative
definitions of adverse conditions are considered. In addition to the definition based on positive and
negative growth rates, the variables are also compared with their "normal times" levels. These are
defined as the firm-specific median (or first quartile) over the period 1993-2001. To compute these,
only firms with at least three observations are considered12.
  Finally, these two datasets are merged. A final trimming is undertaken so as to make individual
earnings data as representative as possible of the firms. First, the wage bill growth as computed
from information in the annual accounts is not allowed to deviate too far from that computed by
summing individual annual earnings within the firm. More precisely, the difference between the
log difference wage bill given by the annual accounts and the log difference of the sum of
individual earnings should be smaller than 0.15 in absolute value. Robustness tests with respect to a
stricter criterion, 0.05, and to a less strict criterion, 0.25, are reported in Appendix 2. Also, I keep
firm-year observations which cover at least 10 individual salaries of job stayers and 10% of the
number of stayers reported in the social balance sheet, and if there are job flows within the firm in
that year, at least 2 entrants (exiters), provided they represent at least 5% of the numbers of entrants
(exiters) reported in the social balance sheet.
11   Note that this may be the case when the firm mainly employs workers for short-term periods.
12   In addition, these observations must lie within the 1st and 99th percentile, defined year by year.15
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  Table A1 in Appendix 1 describes the trimming procedure in terms of number of firms. The
more severe trimming is actually due to the matching of the individual earnings dataset with firms’
annual accounts, as well as to criteria related to the representativeness of individual earnings data at
the firm level, i.e. the last criterion described in the preceding paragraph. Descriptive statistics for a
control sample of firms, not matched with the individual earnings dataset, are also reported in
Table A2 in Appendix 1. These show that in the sample used in this paper there are fewer
variations (standard deviations are smaller) in employment growth, wage bill growth and hours
worked growth than in the control sample, due to trimming for outliers. However, the average
figures are of the same order of magnitude.
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample, which contains 4,705 observations, 1,974
firms, and covers more than 200,000 employees.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
mean std Q1 median Q3
'wage bill 0.060 0.094 0.008 0.052 0.105
'number of employees 0.033 0.097 -0.020 0.022 0.077
%entrantst 0.233 0.142 0.127 0.202 0.309
%exitst 0.204 0.127 0.114 0.173 0.263
retirementt/exitst 0.021 0.060 0 0 0.017
early retirementt/exitst 0.039 0.091 0 0 0.038
layoffst/exitst 0.209 0.209 0.057 0.154 0.302
'hours/FTE -0.006 0.055 -0.026 -0.006 0.013
'%part-time workers 0.005 0.021 -0.003 0.000 0.011
'interim hours 0.078 0.858 -0.346 0.054 0.489
'w
blue
0.038 0.042 0.024 0.035 0.051
'w
white
0.059 0.063 0.032 0.051 0.075
wentrant-wstayer -0.156 0.195 -0.263 -0.150 -0.049
wexit-wstayer(t-1) 0.010 0.253 -0.128 -0.023 0.109
# firm-year observations 4705
# firms 1974
# workers 208059
' refers to the first difference of the log of the variable; '% part-time workers to the first difference of the
percentage of part-time workers; the ratios %entrantst, %exitst-1 , %exitst are computed with respect to the
number of employees at the end of the year; wentrant-wstayer is the difference between the low earnings of
entrants and the log earnings of incumbents; number of employees is given at the end of the year.
  On average over the period, the total nominal wage bill increases by 6% and employment by
3%. Entries represent up to 23% of the number of employees at the end of the year, and exits 20%.
Layoffs account for more than 20% of exits, and retirement and early retirement for 6%. Note 
also that, over the period, there is a decline in the number of hours worked per full-time equivalent
and growing use of interim (manpower) hours. Heterogeneity across firms in the increase of
manpower hours is the largest of all variables reported in the Table. Averages of individual wages
by firm also suggest that nominal wage increases amount to around 4% for blue collars and 6% for
white collars. Finally, it is worth noting that entrants’ wages are, on average, 15% lower than those
of incumbents. One explanation for this is that holiday allowances are not paid by the firm in the16
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first year of work; these allowances make up 15.34% of the annual earnings of white-collar
workers and 15.38% for blue-collar workers.
3.2. Institutional features of the Belgian labour market
This section briefly reviews some features of the Belgian labour market that may be relevant for
understanding wage bill adjustment. Notable characteristics of wage formation in Belgium are the
existence of a minimum wage, indexation, a cap on wage increases, and the importance of sectoral
collective bargaining. As far as employment is concerned, adjustment of the labour force may be
eased by early retirement, temporary unemployment as well as overtime.
  First, a floor for nominal wages is determined by collective agreement and transposed into law.
This minimum wage applies to workers over 21 years old and with at least six months’ tenure. This
prevents wage cuts that would drive wages below this threshold.
 Second,  a  prominent  feature  of  the  Belgian  labour  market  is  full  automatic  indexation  of
nominal gross wages. Indexation is applied with respect to the so-called health index, which is the
consumer price index excluding alcoholic beverages, tobacco and motor fuels. This makes nominal
and real wage reductions of job stayers very rare.
  Third, in addition to indexation, real wage increases in the private sector are also largely
established by negotiation between the social partners. Since 199713, the so-called wage norm
provides a guideline for maximum nominal hourly labour cost increases. It is fixed for two years by
an InterProfessional Agreement between employers and workers’ representatives. It depends on,
among other things, labour cost developments in Belgium’s main trading partners - Germany,
France and the Netherlands - and includes predicted indexation.
  Fourth, collective bargaining at the sector level has the major role in wage formation.
Employers and unions bargain with an equal weight to determine various aspects of wages, as well
as other aspects of labour (such as training, mobility, among others). These negotiations are often
separate for white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. Sector-level collective agreements set
pay scales as well as real wage increases. Pay scales define a minimum wage by sector and
occupation. These also depend on age or tenure for white-collar workers, and for a few blue-collar
workers.14 This implies that automatic wage increases due to age account for a substantial fraction
of the wage evolution of white-collar workers.
  After the wage norm is set at national level, sector-level agreements specify real wage
increases, which often consist of an absolute rise in the minimum pay scale. To gain an idea of the
importance of these mechanisms, note that over the period considered in this paper, indexation
amounts to 0.01 to 0.025 and collectively agreed real wage increases between 0.017 and 0.033, so
that nominal wage increases derived from these figures range between 0.028 to 0.058.
13  Pursuant to the law of 26 July 1996  for the promotion of employment and the safeguarding of firms'
competitiveness.
14  Over the period considered in this paper, pay scales of white-collar workers were generally defined by age.
Following EC anti-discrimination rules, this is less and less the case today.17
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  These features explain why Belgium is characterised as a country with substantial real wage
rigidity. However, it should be noted that labour compensation involves extra-wage components
such as bonuses, premia and overtime hours, which make them more flexible than the base wage.
  Employment developments over the last decade15 have been characterised by a reduction in the
proportion of blue-collar workers in private sector employment (from 54% in 1990 to 46% in
2001), an increasing fraction of part-time workers (they represent 13.5% of employment in 1990
against 17.0% in 2001), fewer hours worked per employee (the annual number of hours worked per
employee fell from 1,601 in 1990 to 1,547 in 2001) and a slightly higher number of employees
with fixed-term contracts. Although fixed-term contracts represent a large fraction of employment
growth (over the decade from 1990 to 2000, they accounted for more than two-thirds of cumulated
employment growth), they still represent a small proportion of wage earners (5.3% in 1995, 8.8%
in 2001) in comparison with EU average (13% over 1996-2001). In addition, Table 1 above shows
that there is an increasing number of interim workers hired from temporary employment agencies;
on average, over 1997-2001, hours hired from temporary employment agencies grew at a rate of
7.8% per year.
  For the analysis below, it is important to understand two relevant features of employment
legislation in Belgium: early retirement and temporary employment. The legal retirement age is 65
for men and 60 for women up to 200216. Also, since 1974, conventional early retirement has been
allowed for workers aged 60 and above (or 58 provided a collective labour convention has been
agreed). For firms in distress or restructuring, early retirement is possible under specific conditions
for workers aged 50 or more. This allows the labour force to be reduced while avoiding or lowering
the number of layoffs.
  For short-term periods, temporary unemployment allows firms to temporarily interrupt (but not
breach) labour contracts. Workers then receive unemployment benefit for a defined period, and are
later re-employed by the firm under the initial contract terms. This may be used in cases of pressing
reason, collective annual holidays, a strike, a technical incident, economic circumstances, or bad
weather. Among the motives for temporary unemployment, those related to a technical incident,
economic circumstances, or bad weather apply only to blue-collar workers (and apprentices). Bad
weather is typically a problem for construction. Special rules apply to the construction sector in the
event of temporary unemployment due to economic circumstances.
  Together with changes in the number of hours (due to overtime hours, for example), temporary
unemployment allows reductions in the number of hours worked, possibly with no change in the
number of employees, and avoiding costly layoffs, as does early retirement.
15   The figures reported in this paragraph come from the Belgian social security Green Book, OECD Employment
Outlook and Eurostat.
16   The legal retirement age for women has been gradually raised to 64 in 2006, and it will be 65 in 2009.18
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4. Results
Results of the wage bill decomposition for the entire sample are presented in the first line of Table
2. The table itself reports the average across firms and years of each of the components described in
equation (7). On average, wage bill changes amount to 5.4%. Half of this can be attributed to wage
changes and the other half to employment changes. Indeed the component related to changes in the
wage of job stayers equals 0.037, and the sum of the last two to 0.031. Note that the second
component, Wnew-Wexit, is always negative, because earnings of entrants, unlike stayers and exiters,
generally do not include holiday allowances, as mentioned above.
Table 2 - Wage bill decomposition
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
entire sample 4705 0.054 0.037 -0.014 0.007 0.024
'WB>0 3694 0.079 0.038 -0.014 0.015 0.040
'WB<0 1011 -0.038 0.031 -0.015 -0.021 -0.032
t-stat equal means 25.880 4.543 0.557 23.490 19.321
'Wstay  stands for
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  Although employment and wages seem to play a symmetric role in wage bill changes on
average, the pattern varies substantially in times of expansion and contraction. Two-thirds of wage
bill increases are due to employment growth while wage bill decreases result from employment
cuts in spite of positive wage growth. The components associated with wage changes of job stayers
are slightly lower in times of wage bill contraction (0.031) than wage bill expansion (0.038), but
the difference is significant. More strikingly, wage bill reductions translate into wage moderation
rather than into wage cuts. This is not surprising as wage indexation prevents nominal earnings of
job stayers from falling. It is also consistent with the evidence of high downward wage rigidity for
Belgium found by Du Caju et al. (2007) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005).
  Alternatively, firms may lower the average wage by reducing the wages  paid to new entrants
relative to those of incumbents in adverse times. However, the discrepancy between entrants’ and
exiters’ wages is not significantly wider in cases of wage bill contraction. This may be due to
fairness, efficiency wage considerations, as well as to institutional features such as pay scales. All
in all, wage changes make a positive contribution to wage bill growth, even in times of contraction.
So, wage bill contraction is accounted for by employment flows.
  Contrary to wage changes, job flows differ markedly when the wage bill is growing and when
it is declining. By adding up the last two columns of Table 2, it can be seen that job flows within
the same year and between years represent 0.055 in the case of wage bill increase, while they
represent -0.055 in the case of wage bill decline. So, while wage bill expansion results from both
wage increases and rising employment, wage bill contraction is characterised by employment19
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downsizing, moderate but positive wage changes. Taken together, the results indicate that the
variable responsible for most of the wage bill fluctuations is the labour force.
  Robustness with respect to alternative trimming of the sample are shown in Table A3 in
Appendix 2. Each component of the wage bill decomposition is the same size in all samples. The
quantitative and qualitative results are therefore robust to alternative samples.
  Results reported in Duhautois and Kramarz (2006) for France confirm that job flows account
for a large part of wage bill variation. Although there is a more substantial reduction in the wage
changes of job stayers in their study17, wage bill destruction is essentially characterised by a sharp
decline in the labour force. More precisely, their results reveal that entrants account for most of
wage bill creation and exiters for most of wage bill destruction.
  Table 3 below reports complementary information on job flows and the labour force from
firms' social balance sheets, as well as additional information on relative wages, wage changes, age,
and number of days worked from the dataset on individual annual earnings. The column t-stat
shows the value of the t-statistics for the hypothesis that the means are equal in both expansion and
contraction.
  As far as wage trends are concerned, Table 3 indicates that wages of entrants are always lower
than those of job stayers; but the difference is no greater in cases of contraction than in expansion.
Wage growth moderation affects blue-collar and white-collar workers, but it is stronger for white-
collar workers18. One reason is that although the base wages of both blue- and white-collar workers
are index-linked and automatic real wage increases are set by collective agreements, a larger
fraction of white-collar workers’ earnings is not subject to these automatic raises, such as bonuses
and premia. Therefore, wage increases may be more easily reduced for this type of workers.
Finally, moderation of the average wage growth may be achieved through changes in the
composition of the labour force. Indeed, Table 3 shows that exits are concentrated among older and
higher-wage workers in cases of wage bill contraction. Exiters earn 4% more than job stayers in
times of wage bill contraction (against 0% in good times).
  As for employment flows, Table 3 confirms that wage bill contraction induces a strong
reduction in the labour force. This is achieved through both reduced entries and increased exits in
the current and preceding year. In adverse times, the higher percentage of exits results mainly from
higher layoffs and early retirement.
 Reduced  entries  and  increased  exits  concern  primarily  employees  with  open-ended  contracts.
This goes against the view that firing workers with open-ended contracts is more costly. However,
one should note that most of the exits are not due to redundancies. The figures reported in Table 3
indicate that layoffs concern one exiter in five. Exits for other motives, including voluntary quits,
account for 74% of exits in good times and 71% in adverse times. Further, as noted above, fixed-
17   This is consistent with evidence of lower downward wage rigidity for France than for Belgium (see Dickens et al.
2007) and Knoppik and Beissinger (2005). Note also that the "stayers" component in Duhautois and Kramarz (2006)
should be compared with the sum of "'Wstay" and "'Dstay" in Table 2.
18   Du Caju et al. (2007) find that downward wage rigidity is higher for white collars. This means that resistance to
wage cuts is higher for white-collar workers. Table 3 shows that earnings growth may be reduced to a greater extent
for white collars. However, because earnings growth remains positive, this does not imply a reduction in earnings
level.20
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term contracts are quite rare in Belgium: over the period 1997-2001, they accounted for only 8.4%
of wage earners aged between 15 and 64 years. Therefore, because workers with open-ended
contracts  make up the bulk of the labour force, they also account for the largest proportion of exits.
  There is some evidence that firms also take advantage of temporary contracts to enable them to
reduce the labour force at no cost simply by not renewing the contract. Indeed, the number of
entrants with fixed-term contracts as a percentage of the total number of employees is significantly
lower in the event of wage bill contraction. This is consistent with Kleinknecht et al. (2006) who
provide evidence for the Netherlands that the use of temporary contracts and self-employed
(freelance) workers allow firms to save on their average wage bill. Two elements may explain why
the percentage of workers under fixed-term contract does not drop to zero when the wage bill
diminishes. The primary reason is that if the wage bill contraction reacts to a permanent shock,
firms need to reduce employment on a permanent basis, and may cut the most costly components
of the labour force, i.e. older and higher-tenured workers under open-ended contract. Additionally,
one may argue that employment policies aimed at promoting hiring of young, low-skilled or
unemployed workers, may provide an incentive for firms to hire workers from the target groups on
a temporary basis, i.e. by the time they get the economic incentive (fiscal incentives, subsidy, etc.).
The incentive may be sufficiently high for firms to keep on hiring the target group even when they
cut their wage bill. Note that Cockx et al. (2004, 2005) show that workers hired under subsidised
jobs are not necessarily fired at the end of the subsidy19.
  Finally, the bottom part of Table 3 investigates whether hours worked and hours hired from
temporary employment agencies follow the same trend as the wage bill. The results indeed suggest
that the number of hours worked over a year per full-time equivalent falls as the wage bill
contracts. Unfortunately, the data does not make it possible to check whether this corresponds to a
reduction in normal working time, a reduction in overtime hours or temporary unemployment.
However, the reduction in the number of days worked (by blue-collar as well as white-collar
workers) is most likely due to temporary unemployment.
  Contracts with temporary employment agencies also enhance flexibility provided they are
based on short-term contracts. The figures reported in Table 3 confirm that firms reduce their use
of interim workers as they reduce their wage bill. This finding implies that in order to understand
firms’ reaction to changing economic conditions, one should consider a broad definition of hours
worked that would include hours worked by employees (both with open-ended and fixed-term
contracts) as well as by interim workers (although they do not formally belong to the set of
employees), rather than a narrow definition focusing on the number of employees alone. Using a
broader definition, adverse times would be characterised by a stronger decline in hours worked and
therefore an increase in productivity relative to the narrow definition.
19   They find that a temporary subsidy for hiring young long-term unemployed people speeds up the transition towards
a non-subsidised job for 37% of men and 32% of women.21
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      t-stat
'W
blue  0.038 0.040 0.033 3.63
'W
white  0.059 0.062 0.048 6.53
wnew-wstayer -0.156 -0.157 -0.149 -1.17
wexit-wstayer(t-1) 0.010 0.001 0.043 -4.54
age entrants/stayers 0.83 0.83 0.82 2.82
age exiters/stayerst-1 1.00 1.00 1.01 -2.28
' number of employeest 0.033 0.052 -0.034 27.98
%entrantst 0.23 0.25 0.19 12.80
%exitst-1 0.21 0.20 0.24 -5.41
%exitst 0.20 0.20 0.22 -5.19
retirementt-1/exitst-1 0.021 0.020 0.021 -0.60
early retirementt-1/exitst-1 0.047 0.041 0.069 -6.05
layoffst-1/exitst-1 0.216 0.210 0.237 -3.37
retirementt/exitst 0.021 0.020 0.024 -2.05
early retirementt/exitst 0.039 0.034 0.056 -5.45
layoffst/exitst 0.209 0.209 0.211 -0.27
%entrantst, permanent 0.167 0.178 0.125 13.22
%entrantst, temporary 0.062 0.064 0.057 2.70
%exitst, permanent 0.150 0.145 0.170 -6.24
%exitst, temporary 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.58
%exitst-1, permanent 0.155 0.147 0.182 -5.27
%exitst-1, temporary 0.053 0.052 0.057 -1.54
'hours/FTE  -0.006 -0.002 -0.018 7.72
'D
blue  0.008 0.019 -0.032 9.56
'D
white  0.009 0.019 -0.030 9.78
%interim workers 0.046 0.048 0.039 4.67
'interim workers 0.078 0.110 -0.042 4.16
' stands for 'log except for '% part-time workers, hours for the total number of hours worked, w stands for
the log of earnings W, D for number of work days, permanent for workers with open-ended contracts and
temporary for workers with fixed-term contracts, W
blue and W
white refer to the wage of blue-collar job stayers
and white-collar job stayers respectively.
4.1. Differences across sectors and firm size
This section repeats the wage bill adjustment analysis for firms of different sizes and sectors. First,
I consider differences across medium-to-small firms (between 50 and 100 employees), medium-
sized firms (between 100 and 200 employees) and large firms (with above 200 employees). The
wage bill decompositions reported in Table 4 show that the differences in the wage bill growth and
employment changes between wage bill expansion and wage bill contraction are larger for smaller
firms, consistent with the evidence in Duhautois and Kramarz (2006)20. There are few additional
20   Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) show that defining size classes with respect to current year employment may lead to
fallacious conclusions about job creation and job destruction. Results are essentially unchanged if size classes are
defined according to the average number of employees of the firm over the sample period, as shown in Table A4
Appendix 3.22
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differences across different sized firms. Although not significant, the gap between the wage of
entrants and that of exiters is wider for smaller firms in contraction.
Table 4 - Wage bill decomposition according to firm size
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
49 < number of employees < 100
entire sample 1673 0.060 0.032 -0.010 0.009 0.029
'WB>0 1288 0.092 0.034 -0.008 0.018 0.048
'WB<0 385 -0.045 0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.033
t-stat equal means 14.93 4.86 1.48 14.68 10.44
99 < number of employees < 200
entire sample 1512 0.056 0.038 -0.015 0.007 0.027
'WB>0 1217 0.076 0.040 -0.016 0.014 0.039
'WB<0 295 -0.029 0.029 -0.012 -0.022 -0.024
t-stat equal means 16.77 4.58 -1.39 11.39 11.34
199 < number of employees
entire sample 1520 0.044 0.040 -0.017 0.005 0.016
'WB>0 1189 0.067 0.041 -0.017 0.012 0.031
'WB<0 331 -0.037 0.037 -0.016 -0.021 -0.037
t-stat equal means 15.68 0.88 -0.42 16.73 14.95
'Wstay  stands for
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  Statistics on wage changes, reported in Table 5 indicate, as before, that wage moderation is
stronger for white-collar workers. The main difference in wage evolution across firm size is that a
larger part of the wage bill savings of smaller firms is achieved through a significant increase in the
wages of exiters relative to those of stayers, because, among other things, exiters tend to be a lot
older than in cases of contraction. As far as employment flows are concerned, a prominent
difference across different sized firms is that smaller firms have a higher job turnover, resulting
from larger entry and exit rates. Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004) also report that job reallocation is
stronger among smaller firms. In contrast, Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) find that most of the
aggregate job creation and job destruction is due to larger firms. Another difference across firm
size is that the difference in employment growth in expansion and contraction is highest for smaller
firms21. Layoffs are relatively more frequent for smaller firms, while medium-sized and large firms
make wider use of early retirement. Finally, smaller firms make stronger cuts in hours and days
worked than larger firms, but, unlike larger firms, reliance on fixed-term and interim workers does
not fall.
21  Given that wage bill contractions are, on average, larger for smaller firms, this result does not imply that the
elasticity of employment is higher for smaller firms.23
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Table 5 - Complementary information according to firm size
49 <  employees < 100 99 <  employees < 200 199 < employees
'WB>0 'WB<0 t-stat 'WB>0 'WB<0 t-stat 'WB>0 'WB<0 t-stat
'W
blue  0.038 0.030 2.39 0.040 0.031 4.65 0.042 0.038 0.95
'W
white  0.058 0.041 4.76 0.064 0.050 4.09 0.064 0.055 2.46
wnew-wstayer -0.149 -0.150 0.11 -0.165 -0.136 -2.03 -0.159 -0.158 -0.08
wexit-wstayer(t-1) -0.045 0.021 -3.89 0.004 0.027 -1.57 0.048 0.082 -2.31
age entrants/stayers 0.85 0.83 1.39 0.83 0.82 0.90 0.81 0.79 3.18
age exiters/stayerst-1 0.98 1.01 -2.28 1.00 1.01 -0.47 1.02 1.03 -1.16
' n° of employeest 0.060 -0.034 16.54 0.053 -0.028 14.78 0.042 -0.041 17.81
%entrantst 0.29 0.22 8.42 0.25 0.18 6.86 0.20 0.14 8.19
%exitst-1 0.24 0.28 -2.81 0.20 0.23 -2.67 0.16 0.20 -5.24
%exitst 0.24 0.26 -2.72 0.20 0.22 -2.41 0.16 0.19 -4.04
retirementt-1/exitst-1 0.016 0.015 0.38 0.019 0.022 -1.12 0.027 0.028 -0.32
early retire.t-1/exitst-1 0.022 0.039 -2.84 0.038 0.066 -3.36 0.066 0.105 -4.49
layoffst-1/exitst-1 0.239 0.262 -1.55 0.213 0.244 -2.10 0.176 0.203 -2.30
retirementt/exitst 0.016 0.021 -1.29 0.018 0.022 -1.24 0.026 0.029 -1.05
early retirementt/exitst 0.020 0.025 -0.99 0.028 0.054 -3.39 0.055 0.093 -4.76
layoffst/exitst 0.231 0.237 -0.41 0.213 0.201 0.84 0.180 0.189 -0.75
%entrantst, permanent 0.225 0.162 6.51 0.178 0.117 6.04 0.128 0.089 4.68
%entrantst, temporary 0.063 0.056 1.01 0.063 0.064 -0.01 0.065 0.051 2.54
%exitst, permanent 0.180 0.205 -3.07 0.142 0.159 -2.18 0.110 0.140 -4.87
%exitst, temporary 0.054 0.051 0.49 0.052 0.055 -0.43 0.047 0.044 0.71
%exitst-1, permanent 0.183 0.229 -5.41 0.147 0.166 -1.93 0.109 0.141 -5.09
%exitst-1, temporary 0.055 0.052 0.48 0.054 0.062 -1.23 0.048 0.058 -1.88
'hours/FTE  0.000 -0.021 5.31 -0.004 -0.017 3.41 -0.002 -0.017 4.56
'D
blue  0.025 -0.037 5.29 0.016 -0.025 4.18 0.016 -0.033 11.84
'D
white  0.024 -0.037 5.89 0.018 -0.027 4.79 0.016 -0.023 8.62
%interim workers 0.051 0.041 2.53 0.050 0.044 1.65 0.043 0.031 4.63
'interim workers 0.091 0.020 1.02 0.109 -0.023 2.04 0.129 -0.115 4.33
' stands for 'log except for '% part-time workers, hours for the total number of hours worked, w stands for
the log of earnings W, D for number of work days, permanent for workers with open-ended contracts and
temporary for workers with fixed-term contracts. W
blue and W
white refer to the wages of blue-collar job stayers
and white-collar job stayers respectively.
  Below I examine differences across sectors of economic activity. In order to keep a sufficiently
large number of observations per category, I consider only three broad sectors, manufacturing,
construction and commercial services. As shown in Table 6, wage bill changes are smallest in
manufacturing and largest in construction, and so are the net job flow components of wage bill
growth. Comparing expansions and contractions, it appears that wage moderation is largest in
services and largely absent in the construction industry. This is most likely due to the large fraction
of the labour force that has lower and more rigid wages22.
22   Du Caju et al. (2007) find that downward nominal wage rigidity is higher for lower wages.24
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Table 6 - Wage bill decomposition across sectors
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
manufacturing
WB 2272 0.048 0.035 -0.012 0.005 0.020
'WB>0 1762 0.073 0.037 -0.012 0.014 0.034
'WB<0 510 -0.035 0.030 -0.011 -0.023 -0.031
t-stat equal means 22.56 5.13 -0.57 18.03 15.48
construction
WB 549 0.056 0.033 -0.008 0.009 0.023
'WB>0 428 0.085 0.033 -0.007 0.019 0.040
'WB<0 121 -0.047 0.031 -0.012 -0.028 -0.037
t-stat equal means 10.37 0.53 1.19 14.46 7.09
commercial services
WB 1768 0.061 0.039 -0.018 0.008 0.031
'WB>0 1414 0.086 0.041 -0.017 0.015 0.047
'WB<0 354 -0.038 0.032 -0.021 -0.017 -0.031
t-stat equal means 12.74 2.35 0.66 11.18 10.28
'Wstay  stands for
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  Additional statistics provided in Table 7 confirm that wage moderation is very modest in the
construction sector. As before, wage moderation is more severe for white-collar workers. The
difference in wage growth between expansion and contraction is not significant for white-collar
workers in construction, while it amounts to -1.8% for white-collar workers in the services sector
(and 1.2% in manufacturing).
  There are other marked differences across sectors with respect to employment flows, and
changes in hours worked and interim workers. As noted above, labour force fluctuations appear to
be largest in construction and services and lowest in the manufacturing sector. Finding stronger
variation in services than in manufacturing is consistent with the evidence reported in Gomez-
Salvador et al. (2004). They show that job flows are larger in the services sector in Europe, mainly
due to job creation, and lower in manufacturing23. The stronger variation in net employment in
construction is due to higher exits, in the form of relatively higher layoffs. There seems to be no
systematic increase in the use of early retirement in times of contraction in this sector. On the
contrary, there is evidence that the construction industry makes much more use of temporary
unemployment, which is somewhat tailor-made for this sector. Indeed, the reduction in the number
of days worked between expansions and contractions is particularly important for blue-collar
workers in this sector. Hours worked by employees and interim workers also fall significantly in
adverse times. Manufacturing is characterised by wider use of early retirement. Also, it is the sector
23   In the present sample, employment growth is on average 4.3 percent in services against 3.0 percent in construction
and 2.6 percent in manufacturing. Both entries and exits are higher in services (0.29 for entries and 0.25 for exits)
and lower in manufacturing (0.19 for entries and 0.18 for exits).25
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where the reduction in fixed-term workers and interim workers is the most marked. On the
contrary, wage bill contractions in the services sector are primarily characterised by higher
retirements. There is basically no change in the use of interim workers in this sector.
Table 7 - Complementary information according to sector
manufacturing construction commercial services
'WB>0 'WB<0 t-stat 'WB>0 'WB<0 t-stat 'WB>0
'W
blue  0.040 0.034 3.44 0.040 0.035 2.88 0.038 0.031 1.31
'W
white  0.060 0.048 4.68 0.053 0.050 0.34 0.066 0.048 5.33
wnew-wstayer -0.131 -0.123 -0.82 -0.108 -0.115 0.50 -0.201 -0.198 -0.25
wexit-wstayer(t-1) 0.026 0.055 -2.53 -0.014 0.022 -1.57 -0.024 0.032 -3.14
age entrants/stayers 0.82 0.81 2.02 0.83 0.80 1.81 0.85 0.83 1.52
age exiters/stayerst-1 1.01 1.02 -1.18 1.01 1.01 0.45 0.99 1.01 -2.52
' n° of employeest 0.045 -0.038 20.36 0.050 -0.040 9.59 0.061 -0.027 16.01
%entrantst 0.20 0.14 10.42 0.26 0.21 3.58 0.30 0.23 7.44
%exitst-1 0.17 0.21 -3.84 0.21 0.27 -3.97 0.24 0.28 -3.08
%exitst 0.16 0.18 -4.17 0.21 0.25 -3.55 0.24 0.27 -2.72
retirementt-1/exitst-1 0.021 0.018 1.250 0.017 0.013 1.24 0.019 0.028 -2.61
early retire.t-1/exitst-1 0.060 0.098 -5.039 0.046 0.045 0.09 0.018 0.037 -3.50
layoffst-1/exitst-1 0.196 0.226 -2.564 0.262 0.281 -0.70 0.216 0.241 -1.88
retirementt/exitst 0.020 0.021 -0.292 0.017 0.013 1.23 0.017 0.032 -3.83
early retirementt/exitst 0.049 0.082 -4.785 0.032 0.033 -0.11 0.016 0.026 -2.27
layoffst/exitst 0.195 0.204 -0.800 0.243 0.267 -0.93 0.219 0.201 1.57
%entrantst, permanent 0.131 0.084 7.25 0.228 0.175 3.50 0.223 0.164 5.70
%entrantst, temporary 0.066 0.056 2.03 0.029 0.031 -0.35 0.070 0.066 0.61
%exitst, permanent 0.109 0.134 -5.17 0.184 0.224 -3.27 0.179 0.203 -2.84
%exitst, temporary 0.049 0.048 0.36 0.027 0.029 -0.27 0.060 0.059 0.06
%exitst-1, permanent 0.114 0.147 -5.86 0.183 0.232 -3.88 0.179 0.214 -3.71
%exitst-1, temporary 0.050 0.055 -1.09 0.027 0.034 -1.05 0.061 0.066 -0.90
'hours/FTE  -0.002 -0.021 6.29 0.005 -0.015 3.45 -0.005 -0.015 2.82
'D
blue  0.017 -0.033 10.19 0.032 -0.045 11.46 0.017 -0.033 3.27
'D
white  0.016 -0.026 7.42 0.015 -0.021 1.72 0.025 -0.039 6.88
%interim workers 0.061 0.041 8.00 0.017 0.010 2.68 0.042 0.043 -0.26
'interim workers 0.140 -0.074 4.45 0.108 -0.156 1.56 0.070 0.029 0.70
' stands for 'log except for '% part-time workers, hours for the total number of hours worked, w stands for
the log of earnings W, D for number of work days, permanent for workers with open-ended contracts and
temporary for workers with fixed-term contracts. W
blue and W
white refer to the wages of blue-collar job stayers
and white-collar job stayers respectively.
4.2 Differences between wage bill contractions and sales declines
This section repeats the above analysis in cases of falling sales and compares it to wage bill
contraction, the later being easily associated with cost-cutting. But the source of the contraction is
unclear. It may result from a fall in demand, technological change towards more capital-intensive
production technologies, as well as poor performance that calls for restructuring. Sales contraction26
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is likely to be due more frequently to a drop in demand24, although it is of course the result of
several types of shocks.
  The analysis differs from that of Davis and Haltiwanger (1996), who examine the pattern of
aggregate job creation and job destruction over the business cycle. In this paper, the sample period,
1997-2001, is too short and the data frequency too high for a proper business cycle analysis.
Rather, I consider separately firms that experience favourable economic conditions and firms that
face adverse times. This should not be seen as a substitute for a business cycle index. For example,
in downturns, some firms will underperform while others may outperform. The sample splits used
here may capture aggregate shocks as well as sectoral and idiosyncratic events.
  Results of the wage bill decomposition are reported in Table 8. Sales contraction implies a
slowdown rather than a contraction of wage bill growth. Although sales declines are substantial -
on average, sales growth amounts to 13% in expansion against -9% in contraction - the total wage
bill does not come down, but there is a reduction in wage bill growth. Duhautois and Kramarz
(2006) also find that there is more wage bill creation among firms with a high value added growth
rate with respect to the sector third quartile, and more wage bill destruction among firms with value
added growth rate below the sector first quartile. Although, on average, wage bill growth remains
positive when sales are declining, it results from both wage moderation and job cuts. Employment
contraction is indeed what can be expected from sales reductions that lead to production declines.
Table 8 - Wage bill decomposition according to alternative sample splits
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
entire sample 4705 0.054 0.037 -0.014 0.007 0.024
sample split wrt 'wage billt
'WB>0 3694 0.079 0.038 -0.014 0.015 0.040
'WB<0 1011 -0.038 0.031 -0.015 -0.021 -0.032
t-stat equal means 25.880 4.543 0.557 23.490 19.321
sample split wrt 'salest
'salest>0 3319 0.070 0.038 -0.015 0.012 0.035
'salest<0 1386 0.015 0.034 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003
t-stat equal means 14.114 2.995 -2.528 11.355 12.719
'Wstay  stands for
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Complementary information is reported in Table 9. Because wage bill growth does not decline
as much in the case of sales contraction than in the case of wage bill decline, there is less evidence
of both fewer wage changes and falling employment. In the event of falling sales, there is no
24   For example, in a very different context, von Kalckreuth (2003) interprets real sales shocks as a proxy for demand
shocks.27
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significant slowdown of wage evolution for blue-collar workers, and there is a smaller wage
slowdown for white-collar workers than in case of wage bill contraction.
Table 9 - Complementary information according to economic situation
' wbillt 'salest
>0 <0  t-stat >0 <0      t-stat
'W
blue  0.040 0.033 3.63 0.039 0.037 1.02
'W
white  0.062 0.048 6.53 0.061 0.053 3.91
wnew-wstayer -0.157 -0.149 -1.17 -0.160 -0.144 -2.71
wexit-wstayer(t-1) 0.001 0.043 -4.54 0.011 0.008 0.35
age entrants/stayers 0.83 0.82 2.82 0.83 0.83 -0.03
age exiters/stayerst-1 1.00 1.01 -2.28 1.01 1.00 2.24
' n° of employeest 0.052 -0.034 27.98 0.050 -0.007 19.73
%entrantt 0.25 0.19 12.80 0.25 0.20 11.19
%exitst-1 0.20 0.24 -5.41 0.21 0.22 -1.54
%exitst 0.20 0.22 -5.19 0.20 0.21 -1.73
retirementt-1/exitst-1 0.020 0.021 -0.60 0.021 0.020 0.32
early retire.t-1/exitst-1 0.041 0.069 -6.05 0.044 0.054 -2.87
layoffst-1/exitst-1 0.210 0.237 -3.37 0.221 0.202 2.81
retirementt/exitst 0.020 0.024 -2.05 0.021 0.021 -0.18
early retirementt/exitst 0.034 0.056 -5.45 0.035 0.048 -4.13
layoffst/exitst 0.209 0.211 -0.27 0.210 0.206 0.54
%entrantst, permanent 0.178 0.125 13.22 0.179 0.139 10.64
%entrantst, temporary 0.064 0.057 2.70 0.064 0.057 2.97
%exitst, permanent 0.145 0.170 -6.24 0.148 0.156 -2.41
%exitst, temporary 0.051 0.050 0.58 0.051 0.050 0.46
%exitst-1, permanent 0.147 0.182 -5.27 0.153 0.158 -1.01
%exitst-1, temporary 0.052 0.057 -1.54 0.052 0.056 -1.66
'hours/FTE  -0.002 -0.018 7.72 -0.003 -0.013 5.73
'D
blue  0.019 -0.032 9.56 0.018 -0.016 7.51
'D
white  0.019 -0.030 9.78 0.015 -0.006 5.43
%interim workers 0.048 0.039 4.67 0.049 0.038 6.10
'interim workers 0.110 -0.042 4.16 0.173 -0.152 10.78
' stands for 'log except for '% part-time workers, hours for the total number of hours worked, w stands for
the log of earnings W, D for number of work days, permanent for workers with open-ended contracts and
temporary for workers with fixed-term contracts. W
blue and W
white refer to the wages of blue-collar job stayers
and white-collar job stayers respectively
  Concerning employment, in both cases, net employment reduction is achieved primarily
through a reduction in the number of entrants, rather than an increase in exits. This is consistent
with the findings of Messina and Vallanti (2007) that employment protection legislation smooths
the responsiveness of job destruction to the business cycle in Europe.
  The number of employees is reduced mainly through more early retirement, and proportionally
less through redundancies, unlike the case of wage bill contraction. In both cases, hours diminish
and the reduction in the number of days worked points to potential use of temporary
unemployment, which can be used under the motive of "economic circumstances" for blue-collar
workers. The major difference between sales decline and wage bill contraction is that there is a
much stronger reduction in changes in interim workers in the case of sales decline (-0.152) than in28
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the case of wage bill contraction (-0.042). So sales declines may induce a mix of a reduction in the
number of employees together with the use of temporary unemployment, contraction in hours
worked and a substantial cut in manpower workers.
  The above analysis suggests that falling sales lead to labour reductions in the same year, at
limited (firing) costs. Indeed, entries, interim workers and the number of days and hours worked
fall more than layoffs increase. These tools allow for a more reversible decision. In a first stage,
this may be an optimal response in view of the uncertainty surrounding the size and persistence of
the sales fall, and given hiring and firing costs. When sales declines persist, firms may find it
necessary or more relevant to reduce their own labour force.
  A couple of points are worth checking. First, with respect to the timing of the shock, some
timelag may be needed for firms to adjust to sales declines. The wage bill decomposition for the
case of sales declining in the previous year, reported in Table A5 in Appendix 4, suggests that most
of employment adjustment is contemporaneous to the sales declines. Indeed, following a fall in
sales in the previous year, there is no cut in employment and adjustment of the wage bill growth is
much smaller. Second, should the sales contraction become larger and more persistent,
employment cuts may become more necessary. Indeed, considering firms for which the sum of
sales growth in two consecutive years is negative shows that employment cuts are slightly larger.
Third, the previous criteria may be criticised on the grounds that a decline in sales (value added) is
irrelevant if it follows a (large) increase. I therefore consider an alternative criterion: sales growth
is negative and sales are below the firm's median. Again, results of the wage bill decomposition are
of the same order of magnitude. Lastly, Appendix 4 also reports wage bill decompositions for
nominal sales growth as well as real sales growth, nominal value added growth, real value added
growth. The sign and order of magnitude of the terms of the wage bill decompositions are similar
across these exercises.
  In sum, this section highlights the fact that in cases of sales declines, reversible adjustment
tools such as reduction in hours worked, temporary unemployment, and interim workers play a key
role in labour force adjustment.
5. Conclusion
This paper looks at the variables that explain most of the wage bill adjustment under changing
economic conditions. Building on Duhautois and Kramarz (2006), I decompose wage bill growth at
the firm level into four components: (1) one due to changes in the wages of job stayers, (2) another
due to the differences between wages of entrants and wages of exiters, (3) one due to intra-year
net flows of employment, (4) and the last due to between-year net flows of employment. The paper
uses an administrative matched employer-employee dataset on individual annual earnings merged
with firms' annual accounts and social balance sheets for Belgium over the period 1997-2001.
  Wage bill changes are equally attributable to wage changes and net employment flows.
However, this general pattern masks a strongly asymmetric behaviour in favourable as opposed to
adverse times. Employment contractions are the main source of wage bill reductions. On average,29
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firms can at best reduce wage growth rates, but wages do not actually fall. Wage moderation 
may be achieved by concentrating exiters among the older workers and higher earners, or reduce
bonuses and premia. However, fairness, efficiency wage considerations as well as institutional
features of the Belgian labour market, such as full automatic indexation, may prevent strong
nominal wage cuts, as shown in previous analyses of wage rigidity in Belgium. Consequently, job
flows are the main driving variable of the wage bill.
  Comparing periods of wage bill expansion with those of wage bill contraction is used as a
benchmark. The analysis is then repeated for firms of different size classes and sectors, as well as
for the cases of sales falls. Smaller firms and the construction and services sectors experience larger
fluctuations in wage bill growth and employment than do larger firms and the manufacturing
sector. The drop in wage bill growth is larger in cases of wage bill contraction than in cases of sales
cuts.
  In addition to the wage bill decomposition, more detailed information about job flows and
wage growth provide a deeper insight into the relevant adjustment margins in different
circumstances. First, employment cuts are made through reduced entries, and to a lesser extent
through increased exits, which may involve firing costs. In addition, there is wider use of early
retirement, which applies to firms in distress or which are restructuring, especially in the
manufacturing sector. This generally involves lower costs than layoffs. Additionally, there is a
slight reduction in the percentage of workers under fixed-term contracts, particularly in large firms
and in the manufacturing sector. Second, labour force reductions (and labour cost savings) may be
achieved through other margins, such as a reduction of hours worked and the use of temporary
unemployment. Third, there is evidence that interim workers serve as a buffer under changing
economic conditions, more so in cases of sales contraction. This suggests that the firm’s labour
force should be measured through total hours of both employees and interim workers, rather than
by the total number of employees alone. Focusing on the response of the total number of
employees could underestimate the decline in total hours worked and change in productivity in
adverse times.
  Concerning the evolution of wages, increases in job stayers’ wages are restricted in times of
contraction, and more so for white-collar workers who generally enjoy higher pay rises. Because
wages of job stayers do not diminish, firms could save on their average wage bill through a change
in the composition of the labour force or through a reduction in the wage of entrants relative to that
of stayers. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the latter explanation does not apply.
Generally speaking, there is no difference between earnings of entrants and those of stayers in
adverse times than in good times. In some cases, some wage savings are made by hiring younger
workers, or by reducing the number of older workers (inter alia, through early retirement).
  The main differences across sectors are that there is essentially no wage moderation in the
construction sector in cases of wage bill contraction, and therefore employment adjusts more
severely. Further, layoffs are proportionally more important. In addition, there are indications of a
wider use of temporary unemployment, which is particularly well-suited to this sector. On the other30
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hand, contractions in the manufacturing sector lead to relatively more early retirement, together
with the largest cut in fixed-term-contract and interim workers, compared to other sectors.
  A typical feature of sales contraction is the stronger reduction in the use of interim workers, as
compared to wage bill declines. Together with reductions in hours worked, and wider recourse to
temporary unemployment, these allow for a less costly and more reversible adjustment of the
labour force than a reduction in the number of open-ended contract workers.
  All in all, the results plead for a broad view of a firm’s adjustment margins in order to
understand its response to unfavourable economic conditions. Furthermore, it highlights differences
in the adjustment variables used according to the size, sector, and adverse event considered.
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Appendix 1: Trimming procedure
Table A1 below reports the number of firms at each step of the trimming procedure. Starting with
the set of firms that report detailed annual accounts, I exclude foreign and public companies and
non-profit associations. Then I consider only those firms with a reporting period from January to
December. Consistency of social balance sheets implies that the number of employees at the end of
the year, and the average number over the year, as reported in the notes to the annual accounts must
be the same as those reported in the social balance sheet. Then, to compute the changes in each
variable, firms have to be observed over two consecutive years. Further, I keep only those firms for
which net job flows, given by the difference between entries and exits as reported in the social
balance sheet, do not deviate from five in absolute value from employment changes over two
consecutive years, given in annual accounts. Also the number of entries over the year cannot
exceed the number of employees at the end of the year. Then, I restrict the set of firms to those
above 50 employees25. This dataset is matched with the sample of individual earnings data. I
remove the 1st and 99th percentiles (defined on a yearly basis) of the following variables: sales
growth, value added growth, employment, profits, productivity. A final trimming aims to make
individual earnings data as representative as possible of the firms. The wage bill growth as
computed from the annual account information is not allowed to deviate by more than 0.15 in
absolute value from that computed by summing individual earnings within the firm. Further, I
consider only firm-year observations for which there is at least 10 individual earnings of job stayers
and 10% of the number of stayers reported in social balance sheets, and in case there are job flows
within the firm in that year, at least 2 entrants (2 exiters), provided they represent at least 5% of the
numbers of entrants (exiters) reported in social balance sheets.
  For comparison, Table A2 reports the same numbers for the final dataset as well as for a larger
sample of firms, referred to as the "control sample". This sample is selected along the same criteria
as before except that it is not matched with the individual wages dataset, i.e. it meets the first seven
criteria listed in Table A1.
25   Firms with at least 50 employees must, by law, have union representation within the firm.33
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Table A1 - Number of firms at different steps of the trimming procedure
cleaning in annual accounts
1. with detailed annual accounts 22566
2. which are profit maximisers 22096
3. with annual accounts from January to December  17763
4. with consistent social balance sheet 11572
5. with two consecutive annual accounts 9901
6. with consistent flows of workers 9781
7. with at least 50 employees 3497
8. matched with individual wage dataset 3166
9. with cleaned annual accounts variables 2987
cleaning in individual earnings data
10. |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15 2821
11. with enough stayers, entrants and exiters 1974
Table A2 - Representativity of the final dataset
final dataset control dataset
mean std mean std
'Wbill 0.060 0.094 0.070 0.167
'L 0.033 0.097 0.037 0.161
%entrantst 0.233 0.142 0.247 0.171
%exitst 0.204 0.127 0.221 0.172
retirementt/exitst 0.021 0.060 0.020 0.064
early retirementt/exitst 0.039 0.091 0.035 0.094
layoffst/exitst 0.209 0.209 0.215 0.228
'hours/FTE -0.0057 0.055 -0.0054 0.109
'%part time workers 0.0045 0.021 0.0035 0.027
'interim workers 0.078 0.858 0.067 0.912
# obs 4705 10995
# firms 2079 3497
' refers to the first difference of the log of the variable; '% part-time workers to the first difference of the
percentage of part-time workers; the ratios %entrantt, %exitst-1, %exitst are computed with respect to the
number of employees at the end of the year; wentrant-wstayer is the difference between the low earnings of
entrants and the log earnings of incumbents. The final dataset is the one used in the analysis of the paper; the
control dataset is the sample of large and medium-sized firms that fulfil the same consistency checks as the
final dataset except that it is not matched with the individual wages dataset.34
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Appendix 2: Robustness with respect to alternative data trimming
I examine here the robustness of the wage bill decompositions with respect to the trimming
procedure used to clean up the data. In the sample used in the paper, the following three criteria
were applied: (1) full-year workers are defined as those with a maximum of two months of sick
leave; (2) the firm's wage bill growth computed from the data on individual earnings does not
deviate from the wage bill growth as reported in the annual accounts by more than 0.15 in absolute
value; and (3) individual earnings above the 99th percentile were excluded. This appendix
examines deviations from these criteria. Firstly, the first four lines of Table A3 allow full-year
workers to have a maximum of 1, 2 , 3 or 4 months’ sick leave. Secondly, I modify the condition
that the firm's wage bill growth computed from the data on individual earnings does not deviate
from the wage bill growth as reported in the annual accounts. I relax the criterion to be 0.25 in
absolute value, then restrict it to 0.05. Thirdly, I consider two alternative trimmings of high wages:
no trimming as opposed to a more severe trimming that excludes wages above the 95th percentile.
  Table A3 reports the average across firms and years of the components of the wage bill growth
(equation (7)). The results show that the estimates of each component is the same order of
magnitude as in the base case. Furthermore, the significance of the differences between cases of
wage bill expansion and wage bill contraction are identical. So, the qualitative and quantitative
conclusions are robust to these alternative trimming procedures.35
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Table A3 - Wage bill decomposition (see equation (7))
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
W<P99, 1 month sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 4340 0.053 0.036 -0.014 0.008 0.023
'WB>0 3416 0.078 0.038 -0.014 0.015 0.039
'WB<0 924 -0.041 0.029 -0.016 -0.018 -0.036
t-stat equal means 26.41 7.65 0.94 20.49 19.14
W<P99, 2 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 4705 0.054 0.037 -0.014 0.007 0.024
'WB>0 3694 0.079 0.038 -0.014 0.015 0.040
'WB<0 1011 -0.038 0.031 -0.015 -0.021 -0.032
t-stat equal means 25.88 4.54 0.56 23.49 19.32
W<P99, 3 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 4981 0.054 0.037 -0.015 0.006 0.026
'WB>0 3899 0.080 0.039 -0.014 0.014 0.042
'WB<0 1082 -0.038 0.032 -0.017 -0.023 -0.030
t-stat equal means 25.25 3.30 0.95 24.26 19.70
W<P99, 4 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 5208 0.056 0.038 -0.015 0.006 0.028
'WB>0 4072 0.083 0.039 -0.014 0.014 0.043
'WB<0 1136 -0.039 0.033 -0.019 -0.024 -0.028
t-stat equal means 26.39 2.90 1.53 24.88 18.94
W<P99, 2 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.25
entire sample 5040 0.053 0.036 -0.014 0.007 0.025
'WB>0 3922 0.079 0.038 -0.014 0.014 0.041
'WB<0 1118 -0.037 0.031 -0.015 -0.020 -0.032
t-stat equal means 26.53 4.24 0.65 22.95 20.32
W<P99, 2 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.05
entire sample 2831 0.049 0.036 -0.014 0.006 0.021
'WB>0 2253 0.073 0.038 -0.014 0.014 0.036
'WB<0 578 -0.047 0.030 -0.015 -0.025 -0.038
t-stat equal means 19.82 3.16 0.28 22.49 14.87
W free, 2 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 4741 0.055 0.037 -0.013 0.007 0.024
'WB>0 3726 0.080 0.038 -0.013 0.015 0.040
'WB<0 1015 -0.037 0.030 -0.014 -0.021 -0.032
t-stat equal means 25.99 4.62 0.50 23.67 19.52
W<P95, 2 months sick, |'WB_AA-'WB_KSZ|<0.15
entire sample 4654 0.052 0.036 -0.016 0.007 0.024
'WB>0 3653 0.077 0.038 -0.016 0.015 0.039
'WB<0 1001 -0.039 0.031 -0.017 -0.021 -0.032
t-stat equal means 25.49 4.43 0.56 23.44 19.02

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Appendix 3: Robustness with respect to alternative definition of size classes
Table A4 below reports the wage bill decomposition for alternative firm sizes, where size classes
are defined according to the average number of employees of the firm over the sample period,
rather than the current number of employees, as is done in Table 4. Results are of the same order of
magnitude as in Table 4 so that the conclusions remain unchanged.
Table A4 - Wage bill decomposition according to firm average size (see equation (7))
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew-Dexit
49 < number of employees < 100
entire sample 1647 0.065 0.032 -0.009 0.009 0.032
'WB>0 1277 0.094 0.034 -0.008 0.017 0.050
'WB<0 370 -0.035 0.025 -0.012 -0.019 -0.029
t-stat equal means 17.61 5.06 1.27 13.85 12.51
99 < number of employees < 200
entire sample 1549 0.056 0.038 -0.017 0.007 0.028
'WB>0 1243 0.078 0.040 -0.016 0.014 0.041
'WB<0 306 -0.035 0.029 -0.018 -0.025 -0.022
t-stat equal means 15.14 4.46 0.25 12.63 11.38
199 < number of employees
entire sample 1509 0.040 0.040 -0.017 0.005 0.011
'WB>0 1174 0.063 0.041 -0.017 0.012 0.027
'WB<0 335 -0.042 0.037 -0.015 -0.020 -0.044
t-stat equal means 12.40 0.92 -0.62 15.88 10.05
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Appendix 4: Robustness with respect to alternative criteria
Table A5 - Wage bill decomposition (see equation (7))
# obs 'WBit 'Wstay Wnew-Wexit 'Dstay Dnew - Dexit
entire sample 4705 0.054 0.037 -0.014 0.007 0.024
sample split wrt 'salest
'salest>0 3319 0.070 0.038 -0.015 0.012 0.035
'salest<0 1386 0.015 0.034 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003
t-stat equal means 14.114 2.995 -2.528 11.355 12.719
sample split wrt 'salest-1
'salest-1>0 3289 0.062 0.037 -0.016 0.009 0.032
'salest-1<0 1393 0.035 0.036 -0.010 0.002 0.007
t-stat equal means 5.659 0.570 -3.155 4.385 6.766
sample split wrt 'salest+'salest-1<0
'salest+'salest-1>0 3540 0.070 0.037 -0.014 0.011 0.036
'salest+'salest-1<0 1142 0.004 0.035 -0.012 -0.007 -0.012
t-stat equal means 12.785 0.812 -0.958 12.190 12.377
sample split wrt 'salest and salest<median
'salest>0 or salest>median 3933 0.063 0.038 -0.015 0.010 0.030
'salest<0 and
salest<median
724 0.003 0.031 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008
t-stat equal means 11.715 4.561 -1.780 10.257 10.138
sample split wrt 'real salest
'real salest>0 3016 0.074 0.038 -0.015 0.013 0.038
'real salest<0 1689 0.018 0.034 -0.012 -0.004 0.000
t-stat equal means 13.941 2.573 -1.867 11.680 12.088
sample split wrt 'value addedt
'value addedt>0 3105 0.074 0.038 -0.016 0.014 0.038
'value addedt<0 1600 0.014 0.034 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002
t-stat equal means 15.542 2.533 -2.748 14.604 12.900
sample split wrt 'real value addedt
'real value addedt>0 2866 0.077 0.038 -0.016 0.015 0.040
'real value addedt<0 1839 0.018 0.035 -0.011 -0.005 0.000
t-stat equal means 15.640 2.510 -2.509 13.421 13.175
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